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A commentary on
Religious credence is not factual belief
by Van Leeuwen, N. (2014). Cognition 133, 698–715. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.015
Van Leeuwen (2014) claims religious credences are not factual beliefs. He holds that while factual
beliefs alone (i) guide behavior in all relevant practical settings, (ii) support inferences between
religious credences and (iii) are evidentially vulnerable; religious credences instead (a) have a
perceived normative orientation, (b) are open to free elaboration and (c) are vulnerable to special
authority. However, it is relatively easy to think of potential counterexamples to that seemingly
neat dichotomy, as Van Leeuwen allows. Thus, rituals—such as rain dances—often have purported
mundane effects that render beliefs regarding them evidentially vulnerable. The beliefs regarding
such rituals must support inferences between factual claims about the details of the ritual to be
performed and its efficacy, and certainly do guide ritual behavior in the relevant practical setting.
The literature on ritual failure seems to bear out such a more heterogenous view of religious beliefs
(Hüsken, 2007).
Yet, it is not easy to judge the significance of such examples. Van Leeuwen is right to point
out, after all, that claims normally deemed to be religious may have the traits of factual claims and
vice versa. But, while undoubtedly true, this view has much scope for abuse along the lines of the
no-true-Scotsman objection and, therefore, must be used advisedly when dealing with potential
counterexamples. More importantly, Van Leeuwen does not really provide any evidence that the
triplets of traits he identifies do regularly co-occur in the property space occupied by various
propositional attitudes. He merely provides suggestions as to why some of the traits may co-occur.
To show that a relatively clear distinction does exist—that factual beliefs and religious credences
are clearly separable attractor positions in this space—it would be necessary to plot a representative
sample of propositional attitudes in the property space and see whether they do cluster. What
is more, such a study would need to be done cross-culturally, to avoid the possibility that the
distinction is a WEIRD, post-secularization phenomenon (Henrich et al., 2010).
To better appreciate the distinctions among propositional attitudes, however, I would suggest
that it would be better to consider the underlying reasons for any differences in how people think
about mundane claims (I will use the term “mundane” as it does not beg the question that religious
claims are not factual) as opposed to religious claims, and ideologies in general. These differences
are systematic, maintained by social and cultural institutions and exist for a very good reason.
In evaluating claims made by others, people practice epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010).
This vigilance can focus on the content of the claim (as per iii) as well as the source (as per c). Thus,
when someone tells us where a petrol station is, we can consider whether the location they name
is plausible as well as whether they are likely to know it. Which factors are considered depends as
much on the social and epistemic context of the claim as its content. Scientific institutions such as
blind review tend to promote content vigilance, religious ones such as the notion of the sacred
promote source vigilance, while everyday strategies tend to use a mix. Why should this be the
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case? A belief tradition that eschews content vigilance may
maintain beliefs independently of their truth since they will
be judged to be plausible simply because they are believed by
others. This is important in the case of religions. Unlike most
mundane beliefs, and similarly to ideologies, the function of
religious beliefs (and ideological beliefs in general) appears to
be to promote prosocial attitudes, at least in the case of the so-
called “big god” religions (Norenzayan et al., 2016). However,
prosocial functionality is not tied to the truth of belief, unlike
the functionality of beliefs that directly guide behavior (Talmont-
Kaminski, 2013). You get the benefit of finding a store only if
you had accurate directions. But the benefits (reputation, future
cooperation, etc.) from helping someone else find a store are
accrued even if what motivated you to do it was false (belief
in a vengeful god, for example). So, the threat of supernatural
punishment can work independently of the existence of the
supernatural (Johnson and Krüger, 2004). But, for it to work, it
must be believed in—in the sense that people have to consider the
punishment a real possibility. Yet, since prosocial functionality is
not tied to truth, many prosocial beliefs will be false. This means
two things: prosocial beliefs have to be protected against potential
counterevidence; and people who are epistemically vigilant have
to be provided with reasons to accept the beliefs. This is achieved
by promoting source vigilance over content vigilance in the case
of prosocial beliefs.
The differences Van Leeuwen notes largely follow from this.
Most obviously, focus on source vigilance makes prosocial
beliefs, including religious beliefs, particularly vulnerable to
authorities (c) and less so to evidence regarding the content
(iii). Also, given their prosocial function, religious beliefs have
a perceived normative orientation (a) and do not have the
function to directly guide behavior (i). Finally, since logic is
a major tool for content vigilance, drawing inferences (ii) is
de-emphasized while, since the truth value of the claims is
irrelevant to their function, elaboration upon them needn’t be
constrained (b).
Does this mean that Van Leeuwen is right? Yes and
no. He is pointing to a significant distinction. However, I
would argue that it is less straight-forward than he’d like to
think. More importantly, putting it in terms of a distinction
between types of propositional attitudes makes it sound purely
psychological, and ignores underlying social and epistemological
differences. The terminological question of beliefs vs. credences
is secondary to identifying those causes. However, as already
noted, religious claims have to be firmly believed in, in
order to motivate prosocial behavior. So, “credences” cannot
be too different from ‘beliefs’, a conclusion also reached
by Boudry and Coyne (2016) on the basis of a different
argument.
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